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0.2

Abstract

With the globalization of the semiconductor manufacturing process, electronic devices are
powerless against malicious modification of hardware in the supply chain. In order to maintain supply chain security and prevent the insertion of Trojans two possible approaches can
be taken. One possible approach is to establish a trusted supply chain from the design house
to the finished product. However, this often a difficult and expensive endeavor. The other
possible solution is verify the integrity of the final product once it has been delivered.
This second option has spurred a need for accurate and efficient detection methods. The
Ring oscillator network (RON) architecture is used to detect the Trojan by capturing the
difference in power consumption; the power consumption of a Trojan-free circuit is different
from the Trojan-inserted circuit. However, the process variation and measurement noise are
the major obstacles to detect hardware Trojan with high accuracy. In this work, a quantitative comparison is used to evaluate four supervised machine learning algorithms and
classifier optimization strategies for maximizing accuracy and minimizing the false positive
rate (FPR). These supervised learning techniques show an improved false positive rate compared to principal component analysis (PCA) and convex hull classification by nearly 40%
while maintaining > 90% binary classification accuracy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
While the transition from vertically integrated supply chains to horizontally integrated has
decreased costs for integrated circuit (IC) designers; the ”fabless” approach comes with the
steep price of trust [2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Semiconductor designers now must trust
their intellectual property (IP) to multiple parties in order to have their ICs manufactured
at foundries [12, 9]. Not only do they run the risk of having their IP stolen, but it is not
uncommon for untrusted system integrators and foundries to insert hardware Trojans before
shipping the final product [2, 3, 5, 6]. These Trojans are capable of leaking sensitive information, disabling key portions of the IC, self-destructing the chip, or hindering performance
[2, 3]. This has driven the need for fast, accurate, and simple methods of detecting infected
ICs before they are able to taint the supply chain.
These attacks are only on the rise and growing in magnitude. Recently, allegations that
even one of the world’s most well-known computer hardware manufacturers, SuperMicro,
was subject to such additions to the hardware they prepared for technology giants such as
Amazon and Apple [1]. Furthermore, the United States government has been quite active
in finding ways of securing government and contractor supply chains [31]. Modern supply
chains are complex and require systems of trust to prevent malicious actors taking advantage
of any steps. By and large these supply chains have become more exploitable due to the
transition from vertically to horizontally integrated supply chains. In an vertically integrated
configuration every stage of the manufacturing process is owned by one company. Everything
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from the initial design to the manufacturing to the final shipments are handled by groups
owned by a single company. While these configurations are much more secure they are often
expensive, and the rising costs of shrinking process nodes has driven semiconductor designers
to outsource fabrication to one of the few global foundries. Fig. 1.1 provides an example of
the many places a destination can reach before its final delivery.

Figure 1.1: A view of a modern semiconductor supply chain [10].
With this rising need, some research in the field of hardware security has been focused
on finding optimal methods of detecting and classifying Trojans. Initial research suggested
the use of semi-invasive strategies such as scanning electron microscopy (SEM) for failure
analysis. However, this is expensive and time consuming for it to be applied to every IC.
Using netlist failure detection techniques was also unsuccessful due to Trojans that add
functional logic remaining undetected.
The most promising technique relies on the use of side channel information as it is noninvasive and can be done quickly. By monitoring side channel information from an IC
power grid it is possible to detect Trojans due to their additional activity [16]. In [14],
the authors developed a ring oscillator network (RON) in a chip’s power grid for hardware
Trojan detection. The increased switching activity from Trojan activation will manifest itself
5

in decreased RO frequencies due to the variable voltage drop in the chip’s power network.
Using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and convex hull classification ([20, 21]) they
were able to achieve greater than 80% classification accuracy with a false positive rate of
50%.
This was improved upon in [17] using a genetic algorithm (GA) for feature reduction
and a support vector machine (SVM) for classification. Feature reduction allows machine
learning algorithms to reduce the feature space and decrease training time and the possibility
of over fitting. The genetic algorithm is built upon the idea of natural selection where the
best features will ”survive” through each generation. When the end of the algorithm is
reached you will be left with the optimal feature set. This in addition to the use of SVM
resulted in 99.6% classification accuracy and a reduced false positive rate. However, [17] still
suffers from a large FPR.
In this work, we present a supervised machine learning approach for the classification
of Trojan free and infected ICs using a RON. The results show that we maintain similar
accuracy to previous work in addition to reducing the FPR by using the K-Nearest Neighbors
(KNN), Support Vector Machine (SVM), Naive Bayes, and ensemble classification algorithms
[24, 25, 26, 27]. Experimental results show detection accuracy > 88% with some classifiers
even reaching 97.4%. Low false positive rates (FPR) were also achieved and in the case of
two classifiers a ∼ 0% FPR was reached.
The rest of this work will be laid out as follows: Chapter 2 will provide all necessary
background information, Chapter 3 will discuss the proposed method of classification and
results, Chapter 4 will discuss possible future work, and Chapter 5 will conclude the work.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Hardware Trojans

Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made by attackers during the design and
manufacturing process [2, 3, 6, 7]. Trojans can be used to degrade performance, steal information, or block functionality of an IC [2, 3]. These unwanted circuit additions are often
hard to detect because they are not always triggered or activated by standard test procedures
[2, 3]. Trojans also come in a wide variety of formats so no single filter can catch them all.
These Trojans are unwanted and pose a risk to the chip owners of receiving secretly modified
hardware that could lead to devastating consequences [2, 3].

2.1.1

Taxonomy

A hardware Trojan can be classified into three main categories according to their physical, activation, and action characteristics [2, 3, 15]. The first category based on physical
characteristics of the Trojan classifies based on whether they are functional or parametric
based. Functional Trojans are those that require the addition of functional logic in order
to operate. Parametric, on the other hand, require only the modification of existing wires
or layout. The next category analyzes the Trojan based on its activation characteristics
[2, 3, 15]. In general this will determine whether a Trojan is activated by an internal or
external trigger, and further classify based on the duration for which the Trojan is active.
7

Internally activated Trojans are used in the case where the malicious actor would like the
Trojan to activate in known conditions. For example, this could be used to activate a Trojan
to leak plaintext from an encryption step or to serve as a ”timebomb” to destroy the circuit
after a set amount of time has elapsed. The final category uses action characteristics to
determine the classification. As stated above, Trojans can really perform three main functions: transmit information, modify the specification, or modify the function of the design
[2, 3, 15]. While some Trojans fit neatly into these categories there are often Trojans that
do not. This taxonomic scheme was designed to provide the means to also classify ”hybrid”
Trojans that are not as simple. A graphical overview of the taxonomic system can be seen
in 2.1.

Figure 2.1: An overview of the hardware Trojan taxonomy. [15]
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2.1.2

Prior Work in Trojan Detection

Initial research into the detection of hardware Trojans was through the use of physical
inspection. These often consisted of semi-invasive techniques such as scanning electron or
scanning optical microscopy. While these methods were feasible for smaller designs they
failed to scale well. Modern integrated circuits can contain millions of transistors and viewing
each and every IC after they are produced is simply too expensive and too slow.
Current Trojan detection methods largely focus on (i) functional testing and (ii) side
channel analysis [7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Functional verification is the attempt to activate
Trojans by applying test vectors and comparing the responses with the correct results [2, 16].
The difficulty with this approach is the rarity of which some hardware Trojans are activated.
It is nearly impossible to explore every possible state of a circuit and search for Trojan activity
[7]. Whereas, side-channel analyses detect the HT by analyzing the physical characteristics
of the IC chip such as transient current, leakage current, delay, energy, heat generation, or
EM radiation [7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16]. In both approaches, the outputs of circuit under test
are compared with the outputs of a golden circuit. Typically, the adversary would design
a Trojan to evade detection by ensuring rare activation to evade logic testing and minimal
physical characteristics, like size, to escape side channel based testing. Backside optical
imaging of the fabricated chip enables extraction of the full standard cell layout of the chip
with the watermarks, which in turn can be validated with image processing against the
expected simulated layout to detect any changes made to accommodate hardware Trojans
[13]. A challenge in backside imaging is obtaining a high enough spatial resolution for an
accurate representation of a nanometer-scale circuit [13].
While all of these methods can provide accurate detection of hardware Trojans there
is one issue that has inspired the use of machine learning and other mathematical based
methods. Due to process variations, or the variation in manufactured ICs, it is difficult to
discern differences in signatures due to process variations or the addition of Trojans. What
could appear to be an infected IC based on its signature could in fact be caused by process
9

variations and vice versa. However, the recent popularity boom of machine learning has
inspired the use of these algorithms for detection [17]. Machine learning algorithms are very
useful for learning patterns in data that may not otherwise be visible to the human eye or
even to simple algorithms. This results in the ability to find the details between a truly
infected IC and one that had its signature changed due to process variations.

2.2

Ring Oscillator Network Architecture

As stated before there are many ways of using information from ICs for Trojan detection.
In this work the central method of gathering information from ICs is the ring oscillator
network. Initially proposed in [35], the goal of the ring is to provide a localized measurement
of IC power consumption. Before explaining how the network is able to capture the activity
of hardware Trojans it is first necessary to explain the concept of a ring oscillator. A ring
oscillator is a simple structure created with an odd number of inverters as shown in 2.2. Since
the inverters will output the inverse of their input the structure continuously alternatives
between two voltage levels. However, the delay will depend on the number of stages and can
be defined by as 2 ∗ n ∗ td where n is the number of stages and td is the delay for each stage
[35]. From this we can derive the frequency of the entire ring oscillator as f =

1
.
(2∗n∗td )

Figure 2.2: A simple ring oscillator [35]
Granted these properties alone are not enough to provide information about possible
Trojans. However, integrated circuits have a relation between increased noise in the power
supply and increased gate delays. Using these two properties and the fact that most Trojans
will result in increased switching activity it is then possible to find infected chips with this
information. By placing several ring oscillators in the power supply of an IC this noise can
10

be captured by measuring the ring oscillators frequency. If the current for a chip with no
Trojans and the ring oscillators can be defined as follows [35]:
i=N

Itotal X
=
λi ∗ N ∗ 2n ∗ kg
f
i=0

(2.1)

Then with Trojans present it will be defined as follows:
i=N
+nt
X
∆Vt
Itotal,t
=
λi ∗ (N + nt ) ∗ 2n ∗ kg ∗ (1 + α ∗
)
ft
Vdd − ∆Vt − Vth
i=0

(2.2)

By placing a network of ring oscillators in the power structure of the IC it is possible
to have a localized global power measurement. The ring oscillator network structure also
has the advantage of having a small size and power footprint. The measurement process
consists of applying a series of test patterns through a linear feedback shift register and
using a multiplexer to select which ring oscillator to measure. Once all the measurements
are complete the ring oscillators are disabled. This prevents any extra power draw during
the chips normal functionality. Additionally, the architecture is resistant to tampering as
any change to even one of the ring oscillators will result in detection.
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Chapter 3
Supervised Machine Learning
Techniques for Trojan Detection with
Ring Oscillator Network
3.0.1

Objectives

This chapter aims to provide a quantitative comparison of four popular supervised machine
learning techniques in the application of hardware Trojan detection. While previous work
has shown high classification accuracy is possible, some have also shown high false positive
rates. Through this comparison the aim is to find a technique that will maintain the high
classification accuracy (>90%) but reduce the false positive rate to under ∼10-15%. The
four techniques were selected based not only on these objectives, but also on their other
characteristics. For example, K-Nearest Neighbors is a simple and fast classifier that can
perform well in many situations. The support vector machine is slightly slower, but has
proven itself to be very accurate. Additionally, the Naive-Bayes classifier was chosen for its
prior work in categorization in fields such as spam detection. The final technique of ensemble
learning was chosen to try to extract the optimal characteristics of all these algorithms.

3.0.2

Supervised Learning

In the field of machine learning there are two main approaches in use: supervised and
unsupervised learning [23]. Unsupervised learning is outside the scope of this work and will
12

not be discussed further for the sake of brevity. Supervised learning algorithms work under
the assumption the training data is labeled before being processed by the algorithm. By
labeling the data, the algorithm then knows the desired output for the given input set and
can create a hypothesis for determining the desired output for future inputs [23]. Within the
topic of supervised learning exist two problem types: regression and classification. Regression
algorithms are going to map input values to a real output value, e.g., predicting stock market
prices given a feature set. On the other hand, classification algorithms will place a set of
input data points into one or more ”classes”, e.g. Trojan free or Trojan infected.
In this work, a binary classification ([22, 23]) approach is used to classify each IC as either
Trojan free or Trojan infected. In order to properly train the classifier we must operate under
the assumption we have data from both Trojan free and Trojan infected circuits. Obtaining
known Trojan free ICs is a challenge in and of itself, but knowing which ICs are infected
with Trojans will require some other method of detection until enough data can be collected
to train a classifier.

3.0.3

K-Nearest Neighbors

One of the simplest and yet most popular machine learning algorithms is k-nearest neighbors
(KNN). When used for classification the k nearest training samples in the feature space are
used to classify the new point through a simple majority vote. This simplicity does come
with the cost of longer classification times for larger data sets. The value k is usually defined
as a positive integer, and in the case of binary classification it is useful to set k as an odd
number to prevent a split decision. The distance metric can be any method of calculating
distance, but Euclidean distance is often used. It can be defined as follows:

d(x, y) =

p
(x1 − y1 )2 + · · · + (xn − yn )2
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(3.1)

As can be seen in 3.1, the value of k will have an effect on the classifiers performance. By
comparing the mean error and accuracy values for a series of k values it is possible to find
the most optimal k value for a data set.

Figure 3.1: An example of the KNN algorithm showing the effect the value of k has on
classification. Notice that the new example will be classified as class 1 if k = 1, but class 2
if k = 3 [18].
The classifier was trained using a range of k values from 1 to 40 and the value with the
best FPR and accuracy was selected without being over fitted. It is usually safe to select a
value of k near the square root of the number of training samples. However, low values of k
will lead to a classifier that performs worse with noisy data, and high values of k can lead
to over fitting the classifier to the training data.

3.0.4

Support Vector Machine

Another popular machine learning algorithm is known as the support vector machine (SVM)
[25]. While not as simple as KNN it is much more powerful for classification and regression
applications. The training of the SVM consists of finding the optimal hyperplane that will
linearly classify data points with the largest margin possible between the two classes of data
points. However, not all data can be linearly separated by a hyperplane in which case we
must apply a ”kernel trick” to transform the feature space.
If we define our training data as a set of points in the form of (x~1 , y1 ), . . . , (x~n , yn ), where
x~i is a vector and yi is -1 or 1 to represent the class of x~i , then we can define our hyperplane
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as satisfying the following equation [25]:

w
~ · ~x − b = 0

(3.2)

If the data set is linearly separable then one class can be defined as anything on or above
the boundary w
~ · ~x − b = 1 and the other class can be defined as anything on or below
w
~ · ~x − b = −1. Now in order to train the SVM we want to minimize the difference between
these two hyperplanes so that the margin between the two classes is maximized. Thus the
problem simplifies down into:

min for yi (w
~ · x~i − b) ≥ 1

n1 ...ni

(3.3)

The classifier will then be defined by w
~ and b. An example of a hyperplane used to separate
two classes of data can be seen in 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Example of a SVM hyperplane separating two classes of data. In this example
A, B, and C would be classified by computing the dot product. They all wold be classified
as class ’x’ [19]
This method will only work for linearly separable data and the classification of other
data requires the replacement of the dot product with a nonlinear kernel function, thus the
name ”kernel trick”. By using the kernel function we can now put a hyperplane in our higher
dimensional nonlinear feature space. In this work, a Gaussian radial base function was used.

k(w
~ i , x~j ) = exp(−γk~
xi − x~j k2 ) for γ > 0
15

(3.4)

3.0.5

Naive Bayes

The construction of classifiers using Naive Bayes is a relatively simple process that can
produce highly accurate and fast classification results using a probabilistic approach[26].
Using Bayes theorem we can generate the probability that a data point will belong to a class
Ck given the presence of one of the features of the data [26].

P (Ck |x) =

P (x|Ck )P (Ck )
P (x)

(3.5)

However, when trying to build a classifier we are interested in the probability a data
point belongs in class given multiple features. Using the chain rule Bayes theorem can be
expanded to account for this. Assuming the n features in the data set can be represented as
X = (x1 , x2 , ..., xn ) then it follows [26]:

P (Ck |x1 , ..., xn ) =

P (x1 |Ck )P (x2 |Ck )...P (xn |Ck )P (Ck )
P (x1 )P (x2 )...P (xn )

(3.6)

Now if we assume the conditional independence of the features in the set:
Q
P (C = Ck ) i P (xi |C = Ck )
Q
P (Ck |x1 , ..., xn ) = P
j P (C = Cj )
i P (Xi |C = Cj

(3.7)

Finally, to create a classification rule we must have a way of making decisions. Using a
maximum a posteriori rule, or simply stated choosing the most probable outcome, we can
decide how to assign class labels to data points.

y = argmaxP (Ck )

n
Y

P (xi |Ck )

(3.8)

i=1

Naive Bayes can be applied in one of three ways to estimate the likelihood of the features.
A Gaussian classifier will assume the features are distributed on a Gaussian distribution,
Multinomial will assume multinomially distributed data, and Bernoulli will assume binaryvalued features. The Gaussian classifier was selected in this work due to the continuous
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nature of the data set.

3.0.6

Ensemble Learning

Ensemble learning is another technique for producing better prediction results using machine
learning algorithms [27]. It operates under the assumption that by combining the predictive
power of single algorithms it is possible to increase the overall possible predictive power.
Several popular strategies include voting, bagging, stacking, boosting, and ”bucket of models”. In this work, we will only be implementing a simple voting method. This is done by
taking the output of each of the three classifiers and using it as a vote. The class with the
most votes will then be the output of the classifier. Theoretically, given an odd number of
classifiers in the ensemble a decision should be made every time that represents the best of
each classifier [27]. However, if the ensemble is made up of an even number of classifiers
situations can arise resulting in split decisions. This is said to be an unstable decision. This
can be mitigated through the use of either an odd number of classifiers or using weighted
voting to reduce the possibility of a split decision.

3.0.7

Ring Oscillator Network and Trojan Detection

Recent work has shown that a ring oscillator (RO) network (RON) connected to the power
supply structure of an IC can be used to detect hardware Trojan activity. As shown in 3.3,
ROs consisting of inverters and a NAND gate for activation control are placed in a vertical
orientation within the power structure of an IC. The ROs are then provided test patterns
from a linear feedback shift register and a decoder. These outputs are then selected using a
multiplexer and a counter registering the number of oscillations from the selected RO. The
RO’s frequency can then be derived from the number of oscillations. Any Trojan inserted
into an IC will result in extra noise in the power supply structure that would not otherwise
be present in a ”golden” chip. By injecting the same test patterns into every IC the Trojans
should at least partially active and thus cause extra noise. Since a RO’s frequency is directly
17

related to its power supply voltage this Trojan caused power supply noise should propagate
to the RO’s frequency and result in differing measurements between clean and infected ICs
[14, 17].
However, the frequency differences are not always discernible to the human eye nor to
simple algorithmic classification strategies due to process variations and other factors. In
[14] Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was used as a means of feature reduction. The
data set contained the frequency data from 8 ROs, but through feature reduction could be
accurately represented with just 3. A simple convex hull classification method was then used
to classify each IC as either Trojan free or into one of the 23 Trojan categories. While the
RON is successful at detecting the difference between Trojan free and Trojan infected circuits
the false positive rate was nearly 50%. Using the data collected from the RON we will try
to improve on this false positive rate while maintaining above 90% classification accuracy.

Figure 3.3: The ring oscillator network used for Trojan detection. While 8 ROs are used
in this configuration the structure will differ based on the power network of the IC you are
trying to protect [14, 17]

3.0.8

Experimental Set-up

We conducted our experiments on eight FPGA boards (Nexys4 DDR development board
[28]). Each FPGA board is divided into four separate regions to increase the sample size.
Each region is considered as an individual IC and Trojan, and the RON architecture is
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implemented in only a single portion at a time in order to make sure that one portion (or
an individual IC) does not interfere another. We used a total of eight 41-stage ROs in each
portion (i.e., IC). We distributed combinational and sequential Trojans ([29]) in one portion
randomly. We used several Trojan benchmarks from Trusthub [29]. We measured the average
RO frequency at room temperature and nominal operating voltage from 50 measurements
(with Trojan and without Trojan) to cancel out the measurement noise. We included ITC-99
([30]) benchmarks for normal operation.

3.1

Method

The method we will use is to use the four previously discussed supervised classification
approaches and optimize them for accuracy and a low FPR. The main motivation for this is
to reduce potential waste of Trojan free ICs that would otherwise be discarded due to being
classified as infected. However, accuracy must be maintained to prevent Trojans from being
introduced into the supply chain.
In order to do this, from the collected data, each chip has readings for two ”golden” or
Trojan free samples and 23 Trojan inserted samples. The data was collected using the test
setup described in 3.0.8. This data was then be labeled accordingly and used to train the
classifiers.
The KNN classifier will then be optimized by finding the best k value for maintaining
accuracy and minimizing the FPR. By training the KNN classifier on a range of k values
and different training sample sizes we were able to select the best value for our data set. The
SVM classifier will be optimized using two slack values pertaining to the Gaussian kernel
function, C and γ. C can be considered the weight correct classification has over maximizing
the margin between the two classes. Gamma is the inverse of the variance of our Gaussian
function. Thus, a small γ will lead to a large variance and points could be similar even if they
are not close together and vice versa. In order to find the optimal γ and C values we have
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used a grid search method in which a given set of values is exhaustively run through until
the best values for the data set are found. The Naive Bayes Gaussian classifier will not be
tuned using any parameters. Each of the three classifiers will then be combined in a simple
voting ensemble in the following combinations: KNN+SVM+Naive Bayes, KNN+SVM,
KNN+Naive Bayes, and SVM+Naive Bayes. The KNN and SVM classifiers will retain the
same optimization parameters as they had being trained individually.

Figure 3.4: A plot showing the effect the value of k has on the classifier accuracy. As can be
seen a k value of 2 provides enough accuracy without being over fitted.

3.2

Results

Following the method above each classifier was trained and optimized for three different sized
data sets consisting of 6 chips, 12 chips, and 24 chips. Each sample size was then repeated
for 20 trials and the average accuracy, false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR),
true negative rate (TNR), and true positive rate (TPR) were calculated and recorded as
follows:
TPR =

TP
TP + FN
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(3.9)

Figure 3.5: A plot showing the effect the value of k has on the classifier false positive rate.
As shown higher values of k will lead to over fitting and higher false positive rates.
T NR =

TN
TN + FP

(3.10)

F NR =

FN
FN + TP

(3.11)

FPR =

FP
FP + TN

(3.12)

The optimization step of the training led to the discovery of useful properties of our data
set. Initial estimates for the value of k when training the KNN classifier used the square root
of the number of samples in the training data set. While this resulted in a very accurate
classifier it came at the cost of a FPR greater than or equal to 50%. This is most likely
a result of the data set having little noise and being very prone to over fitting. In Figure
3.4, the accuracy for a range of k values is depicted, note that as the value increases the
accuracy tends to plateau as a result of over-fitting. Figure 3.5 shows the same plateau for
the FPR. Since we want to avoid over-fitting and lower k values perform well we can assume
the data set is not noisy. This led to the decision to use a k value of 2 for every sample
size. This maintained the greater than 90% accuracy benchmark and had a best case FPR
of only 9.4%, a near 40% decrease compared to PCA and convex hull classification. Even
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with small training sets the KNN maintained a FPR under 20% (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: KNN Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.813
0.815
0.906
FPR
0.187
0.185
0.094
FNR
0.075
0.063
0.051
TPR
0.916
0.927
0.745
Accuracy
0.916
0.927
0.945

Optimizing the SVM proved to be more difficult than the KNN classifier. The grid search
was quick to converge on a C value of 1 and γ value of 0.1, but the FPR left much to be
desired. As can be seen in Table 3.2, the SVM is very accurate but when trained on fewer
samples it struggles with a high FPR. Using a balancing optimization it was still able to
achieve a 97.4% classification accuracy and a 7.1% FPR (Table 3.2) and outperform convex
hull and approach the results achieved in [17]. This leads me to believe that with a larger
data set and increased training set sizes the SVM could become more accurate and reduce
the FPR even further. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to have large data sets due
to factors outlined above.
Table 3.2: SVM Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.445
0.605
0.929
FPR
0.555
0.355
0.071
FNR
0.017
0.023
0.023
TPR
0.983
0.977
0.977
Accuracy
0.940
0.946
0.974

Despite the many operating assumptions the Naive Bayes classifier is a very powerful
but simple and fast method. With no optimization the classifier produced results that
were slightly less accurate compared to the other classifiers. At the 6 chip sample size the
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classifier was 88.3% accurate but had only a 6.9% FPR. The accuracy only dropped 0.1%
when increasing the training sample size to 12 chips, but the FPR dropped to 6.1%, the
lowest FPR of any non-ensemble classifier (Table 3.3). The Naive Bayes classifier produced
the best results in term of FPR but was held back by a higher FNR which led to reduced
accuracy. In theory, this could be reduced by tuning the decision threshold, but would most
likely result in the FPR increasing.
Table 3.3: Naive Bayes Gaussian Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.931
0.955
0.939
FPR
0.069
0.045
0.061
FNR
0.121
0.124
0.127
TPR
0.879
0.876
0.873
Accuracy
0.883
0.882
0.873

When using ensemble learning the hope is the results are better than that of each of the
individual classifiers by themselves. However, it also runs the risk of the opposite occurring.
We encountered both situations while training the ensembles. The ensemble containing all
three classifiers performed better than the lone SVM classifier at the lower training sample
sizes. Yet, it was outperformed at the 24 chip sample size (Table 3.4). The Naive Bayes
and KNN/SVM ensembles had the lowest overall FPRs of all classifiers, but struggled to
beat the desired 90% binary classification accuracy threshold (Tables 3.6 & 3.7). This can
be attributed to the Naive Bayes classifier’s characteristics dominating those of the other
classifiers. Despite the lower accuracy, at the 24 chip training sample size both ensembles
had a 0% FPR. Overall, the best ensemble method was the combination of the SVM and
KNN classifiers (Table 3.5). At the lower training sample sizes the FPR was only 19.6%
and 16.4%, but kept an accuracy of 92.1% and 93.0% respectively. At the 24 chip training
sample size the FPR was 0.03% higher than the SVM alone but with a 3.4% accuracy loss.
Considering the results, the choice for the best approach is very dependent on the data
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Table 3.4: SVM+KNN+NB Ensemble Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.785
0.796
0.908
FPR
0.215
0.204
0.092
FNR
0.066
0.062
0.055
TPR
0.934
0.938
0.945
Accuracy
0.922
0.927
0.943

Table 3.5: SVM+KNN Ensemble Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.804
0.836
0.926
FPR
0.196
0.164
0.074
FNR
0.069
0.062
0.058
TPR
0.931
0.938
0.942
Accuracy
0.921
0.930
0.940

Table 3.6: SVM+NB Ensemble Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.939
0.953
1.000
FPR
0.061
0.047
0.000
FNR
0.125
0.127
0.129
TPR
0.875
0.873
0.871
Accuracy
0.880
0.879
0.881

Table 3.7: KNN+NB Ensemble Classifier Results
Metric

Sample Size
6 Samples 12 Samples 24 Samples
TNR
0.982
0.993
1.000
FPR
0.018
0.007
0.000
FNR
0.122
0.126
0.137
TPR
0.878
0.874
0.863
Accuracy
0.886
0.883
0.873
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set and desired outcomes. The Naive Bayes and KNN classifiers are extremely fast, simple,
and do well at maintaining low FPRs and moderate accuracy throughout the sample sizes.
Combining the SVM and KNN classifiers in an ensemble allowed the classifier to maintain
greater than 90% accuracy, but kept the FPR lower compared to using a SVM alone. Thus,
with very little data the best classification performance will come from a Naive Bayes or
ensemble containing the Naive Bayes classifier such as the KNN and NB ensemble. However,
with sufficient data the SVM classifier alone still provides the best trade off between accuracy
and FPR.

3.3

Summary of Contribution

.......The major contributions of this thesis have been highlighted below.
• Using RON Architecture to Detect Hardware Trojan: The FPGA implementation of
the RON architecture was successfully able to collect frequency data for Trojan free
ICs as well as combinational and sequential Trojan infected ICs.
• Comparison of Different Machine Learning Algorithms on Detecting Hardware Trojan:
The quantitative comparison of four different machine learning algorithms showed several possible best options for a range of training set sizes. Large training sizes favored
the SVM classifier while the Naive-Bayes and ensemble classifiers showed promise with
smaller training sets.
• Validation with Silicon Results: The use of the the Nexys4 DDR FPGA board provided
a data set that validates the results of the classifiers for detecting hardware Trojans in
actual ICs.
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Chapter 4
Future Work
As seen in the previous chapter and in other works, supervised machine learning methods
can provide highly accurate results with the proper tuning and data sets. However, there is
an inherent problem in that gathering large data sets is difficult. For an untrusted supply
chain it requires the gathering data about a set of ICs before reverse engineering them and
finding the known ”golden” chips. This is often an expensive and laborious process. It also
makes training effective classifiers difficult. As can be seen in the previous chapter the most
effective classifiers performed well when they had larger training sets. Unfortunately in an
untrusted supply chain there are not many workarounds to such a problem.
With this in mind, I have begun preliminary investigations into the use of unsupervised
methods of classification. However, the results were insufficient for publication at this time.
Unsupervised methods operate using a data set that is not marked whether the chips are
Trojan free or infected. Rather, they use solely the features of the data set to learn about
underlying patterns. Theoretically, this would allow the classification of chips with very
little ”golden” chip data. By looking at the suggested classifications and mapping it with
the limited ”golden” chips it may prove to be a viable option.
Additionally, generative models have proven to be very promising in the field of machine
learning. One of the most difficult problems in the field is creating algorithms that are
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truly learning and ”understanding” the data. Generative models aim to do this by taking
input data and using a neural network to create similar data to the original data set. The
theory behind the generative approach is a model that can create similar data has effectively
captured the features of the original data set. In the case of the generative adversarial
network (GAN) the generated data is then fed to a adversarial network that makes decisions
on whether the data came from the initial distribution or was created by the generative
network. Not only does this create a network that is extremely efficient at generating data
but one that is also a capable classifier. In the case of hardware Trojans, this may provide
a means of accurate classification with very limited data sets.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1

Conclusion

While the field of hardware Trojan detection is relatively new, it is not without very difficult
problems. Trojan developers are continuously working on their approaches and becoming
better at hiding their malicious designs. This will continue to drive the need for efficient
and accurate methods of Trojan detection. In this work, a quantitative comparison of four
supervised machine learning algorithms’ performance when classifying ICs based on their
ring oscillator network frequencies was presented. This method was able to achieve 97.6%
binary classification accuracy and a FPR of just 7.1% when using a SVM classifier, and
ensemble approaches achieved ∼88% accuracy with nearly no false positives. Despite these
promising results, supervised learning approaches are often impractical in a real supply chain.
As discussed in 4, finding proven ’Golden chips’ is a challenge and knowing which chips are
infected at the scaled assumed in the data set is near impossible. The discussed future work
aims to serve as a workaround for this problem.
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